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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Appellee, * 
vs. * Case No. 960757-CA 
960777-CA 
ELMER R. MONDRAGON, Jr., * 960778-CA 
RONNIE J. MANZANARES, and Priority 10 
CASEY J. CUTLER, * 
Defendants and * 
Appellants. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order from the First District Court, Judge Ben H. 
Hadfield, denying the Defendants' Motion to Suppress. The Defendants face two counts of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8 
(1953 as amended) and one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended). The District Court Judge found that 
there was no reason to suppress the evidence from the search. The Defendants cases were stayed 
pending the result of this appeal. 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal was conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A § 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
Are the trial court's findings of fact, that underlie the memorandum decision on the 
Suppression hearing, clearly erroneous and thus reversible error? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, clear error will be found only when the trial 
court's factual findings run against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 
655, 657 (Utah App. 1996). The trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless clearly 
erroneous. State v. Thurman. 846P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993). 
POINT n 
Were the trial court's conclusions that the Defendant gave voluntary consent to search the 
vehicle and that the officer had reasonable suspicion correct? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on the facts for 
correctness according no deference to the trial court's conclusions. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 
655, 657 (Utah App. 1996), State v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996). Further, 
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 
584, 586 (Utah App. 1994). 
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POINT m 
Was the interrogation of Cutler and Manzanares intrusive, beyond the scope of the stop, 
without probable cause and a violation of their constitutional rights against search and seizure? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on the facts for 
correctness according no deference to the trial court's conclusions. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 
655, 657 (Utah App. 1996), State v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996). Further, 
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 
584, 586 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE 
United States Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
See addendum B. 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14 
See addendum B. 
U.C.A. § 58-37-8 
See addendum B. 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 (2) 
See addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Elmer Mondragon ("Mondragon") was pulled over by a Utah Highway 
Patrol Trooper, for speeding and failure to signal. Incident to the stop, the Trooper searched the 
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car, the trunk and the passengers without voluntary consent. The Defendants filed Motions to 
Suppress, a hearing was held on the Suppression Motions at the First District Court of Box Elder 
County, before Judge Ben H. Hadfield. The Suppression Motions were denied and the 
Defendants appeal the Memorandum Decision and Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE RECORD 
On September 22, 1995, at approximately 1:35 p.m., Trooper Singleton ("Trooper") was 
traveling on southbound 1-15 when he paced a Monte Carlo traveling seven miles-per-hour over 
the speed limit. (R. 4-6). The Trooper stopped the vehicle and obtained the valid drivers license 
and registration from the driver, the Defendant Mr. Mondragon ("Mondragon"). The Trooper 
placed Mondragon's drivers license and registration in the pocket of his uniform. The Trooper did 
not proceed to run an NCIC check on the driver or the vehicle, nor did the Trooper proceed to 
complete a citation for speeding and failure to signal. (R. 23). Instead, the Trooper initiated 
questioning of the driver in regard to an alleged odor of burnt tobacco. (R. 7). 
The Trooper asked if anyone in the car was nineteen (19) years old. One passenger, the 
Defendant Casey J. Cutler ("Cutler"), indicated that he was, but he did not provide identification 
to prove it. (R. 7,18,22). 
With Mondragon's drivers license and registration retained in the Trooper's uniform 
pocket, the Trooper requested to search the passenger compartment of the car for tobacco. 
Mondragon allegedly consented to the search. (R. 8). 
The Trooper requested that Mondragon get out of the car, the Trooper did a pat down 
frisk on Mondragon and ordered that Mondragon stand in front of the vehicle. (R. 8). The 
Trooper requested the passenger in the front seat, Defendant Ronnie J. Manzanares 
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("Manzaneres") to exit the vehicle. The Trooper performed a pat down search on Manzanares, 
requested his name, identification and the Trooper ordered Manzanares to stand in front of the 
vehicle. (R. 8). The Trooper requested the back seat passenger, Defendant Casey Cutler, to exit 
the vehicle and performed the same routine on Cutler. (R. 8). 
The Trooper did a pat down frisk on Cutler and believed he felt a wallet. The Trooper 
requested Cutler to remove his wallet and the Trooper proceeded to open Cutler's wallet. The 
Trooper located Cutler's drivers license in the wallet. The license revealed Cutler's birth date of 
June 06, 1972. However, the Trooper testified his math skills were not good and that it would 
take him "quite a while" to figure out Cutler's age. (R. 16). After, obtaining Cutler's 
identification, the Trooper asked if Cutler had any outstanding warrants. Cutler stated he had a 
warrant outstanding in Salt Lake County. After, obtaining this information, the Trooper pocketed 
the identification, ordered Cutler to stand at the front of the vehicle with the other two 
Defendants, and the Trooper continued on with the search of the vehicle. (R. 18, 23, 28). 
The Trooper found no contraband in the car. After the search, the Trooper ordered the 
Defendants to return to the vehicle. (R. 32). At the time the Defendants were requested to return 
to the vehicle, the Trooper still had possession of the Defendants' identification. (R. 32). The 
Trooper testified that at no time did he have an articulable suspicion of the Defendants 
committing any criminal activity. (R. 32-33). 
The Trooper turned to go back to his patrol car, paused, and then returned again to 
Mondragon and ordered Mondragon to "pop" the trunk to allow the Trooper to look at the 
alleged defective taillight. (R. 20, Video). Mondragon hesitated and stated that he would get the 
taillight checked out in Salt Lake City. (R. 19). The Trooper disregarded Mondragon's request 
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and again ordered Mondragon to open the trunk. When the trunk was opened the Trooper and 
Mondragon looked at the taillight box and determined that access was too difficult without the 
proper tools. (R. 20). 
The Trooper then moved to the left of Mondragon and made inquires in regard to the a 
duffel bag contained in the trunk. (R. 21-22). The Trooper asked to whom the duffel bag 
belonged. Mondragon stated that it belonged to everyone. (R. 13). The Trooper proceeded to 
question Mondragon regarding the contents of the duffel bag. The Trooper was concerned that 
there was tobacco in the bag because of the Trooper's observation of a strong smell of fresh burnt 
tobacco at the inception of the stop and because of the "absolute absence of any smoking material 
in the driver's compartment. (R. 13-14, 22). The Trooper stated it made sense the tobacco could 
be in the trunk. Therefore, the Trooper asked Mondragon if he could look inside the duffel bag. 
Mondragon allegedly stated yes. This consent was after the Trooper had taken the three 
occupants out of the car, searched each one with a pat down frisk, completed a search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle, and was without having written a citation or returning the 
Defendants'identification. (R. 13-14,22-24) 
Upon search of the duffel bag the Trooper found controlled substances and placed the 
three Defendants under arrest. 
The Defendants requested a Suppression Hearing and the State provided evidence and 
testimony of the Trooper. The Defendants' provided a copy of the video made by the Trooper's 
patrol car video equipment. (R. 15, 33). The trial court took the evidence and argument under 
advisement and issued a memorandum decision denying the motion to suppress. The Defendants' 
appeal the memorandum decision. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trooper's misconduct expanded the scope of the detention beyond the purpose which 
justified the detention. Such intrusion violated the Appellants' constitutional rights to be free from 
unwarranted search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment of U.S. 
Constitution, and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS IN THE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD 
BE REVERSED 
The trial court's findings in the Memorandum Decision and Order, from the Suppression 
Hearing, are in error and do not accurately reflect the facts surrounding the incidents leading to 
the search and arrests. 
Utah case law establishes that the trial court's findings of fact that underlie its 
determination will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883, 
885 (Utah App. 1995). This Court found that clear error will be "found only when the trial 
court's factual findings run against the clear weight of the evidence." State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 
655,657 (Utah App. 1996). 
In the present case the trial court found that: 
Trooper Singleton then pulled the vehicle over. During the 
discussion which followed, it was determined Elmer Mondragon 
was the owner/driver of the vehicle and that he had a valid 
driver's license. Additionally, it was determined that Casey 
J. Cutler was one of the passengers and there was an outstanding 
warrant for his arrest. The officer had the defendants 
assist him in testing the turn signals and brake lights and 
determined that neither the turn signals nor the brake lights 
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were working on the rear of the vehicle, although 
apparently the turn signals did work on the front of the vehicle. 
Because the front lights worked, the officer theorized that 
a fuse was not out but that perhaps there was a problem with 
wiring or a light bulb. The defendant opened the trunk of 
the vehicle and it was determined that the taillights were enclosed 
in such a way that tools would be required in order to gain 
access to the bulbs. At that time, a single duffel bag was 
observed in the trunk of the car and the officer asked 
Mondragon if he could look in the duffel bag. Mondragon 
said he could. 
(See addendum C). The trial court in the above findings completely omitted the officer's 
actions in obtaining Mondragon's consent to the search and in maintaining possession of Cutler's 
identification. The trial court failed to discuss and recite the relevant facts leading up to the 
officer's testing of the turn signals and the officer's illegal entry into the trunk. 
The trial court focused only upon the facts surrounding the alleged consent and search of 
the duffel bag without a proper analysis of the total circumstances. The trial court failed to 
analyze the following: 
a) the initial stop when the Trooper expanded the scope of the stop to inquire if the 
Appellants were of legal age to possess tobacco (R. 7,8); 
b) the Trooper's misconduct in continuing the search of the car once the Trooper 
discovered that there was an individual old enough to possess tobacco (R. 18,23,28); 
c) how the Trooper obtained entrance into the trunk. The trial court determined that the 
Appellant opened the trunk of the vehicle, nothing more (R. 19,20); 
d) finally, the trial court did not support its conclusion of how or why the court found the 
Appellant's action of opening the trunk was voluntary. 
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Upon review of the facts, the Appellants assert the Court will find clear error in the 
correctness of the facts. As such, the Appellants request that the Court find that the trial court's 
factual findings run against the weight of the evidence and reverse the trial court's findings of fact. 
State v. Ziegleman. 905 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah App. 1995). 
POINT II 
TROOPER SINGLETON UNLAWFULLY EXTENDED MR. 
MONDRAGON'S DETENTION BEYOND THE PURPOSE 
WHICH JUSTIFIED THE DETENTION. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15 specifically delineates a peace officer's authority to detain 
suspects. That section provides, 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of evidence or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation 
of his actions. 
Thus, by statute, an officer's authority at a traffic stop is limited to obtaining the suspects name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions relating to the stop. The statute does not explicitly limit 
an officer to demanding only those "explanations" that relate to the purpose of the stop. 
However, extensive case law makes very clear the point that an officer is limited to investigating, 
or seeking "explanations," that relate to the purpose of the stop. An officer, for example, who has 
stopped a suspect for speeding is not authorized to demand information concerning matters 
unrelated to the speeding offense. This is exactly what occurred in the present case, and this point 
is addressed more fully below. 
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The Tenth Circuit has held that "[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request 
a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation." United 
States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812, 
815 (10th Cir. 1991). "When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled 
to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further 
delay by police for additional questioning." Id "[Fjurther questioning and the concomitant 
detention of a driver are permissible in either of two circumstances: (1) during the course of the 
traffic stop the officer acquires an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver 
is engaged in illegal activity, or (2) the driver voluntarily consents to the officer's additional 
questioning." United States v. Sandoval 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, in State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), that 
an officer's traffic stop must retain a "reasonable scope," "last[ing] no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id, at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983)). The court further stated, 
The purpose of the stop is to request a driver's license and a valid registration, run a 
computer check on the car and/or the driver, and issue a citation. Unsupported by further 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions 
unrelated to the traffic offense unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the scope of 
the circumstances that rendered it permissible. Thus, existing Fourth Amendment law 
precludes an officer from extending the length or scope of a traffic stop to investigate a 
suspicion of wrongdoing which does not rise to the level of probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion. 
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals "has recognized that '[a]n officer 
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a 
computer check, and issue a citation1. . . Moreover, '[t]he officer may also check for outstanding 
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warrants 'so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention. . . 'Any further 
temporary detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial 
traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity.'" State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 658-9 (Utah App. 1996). 
If an officer violates this constitutional rule, and extends the length or scope of a stop 
beyond the lawful purposes of the stop, then the detention becomes illegal, Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), and the evidence obtained as a result of that illegality becomes suppressible under 
Wong Sun. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
To demonstrate the importance of this rule, and the severity of the consequences of 
breaking it, it is helpful to refer to two cases that have come out of the Tenth Circuit. First, in 
United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th. Cir. 1988), the court noted that even an 
unlawful detention of a relatively short duration is unconstitutional because "it nevertheless 
unreasonably extend[s] beyond the length necessary for its only legitimate purpose~the issuance 
of a citation " Id at 1519 n. 8. Second, in United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 
1991), the court upheld a lower court's finding of a constitutional violation based upon an officer's 
extending the detention only a few seconds in order to ask the driver of the vehicle "if there were 
any weapons in the vehicle, if there were any open containers of alcohol in the vehicle, and if there 
was any controlled substance or paraphernalia of any kind in the vehicle." Id at 814. These 
questions, the court reasoned, were unrelated to the speeding offense for which the officer 
stopped the vehicle, and, as the officer did not have any reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
vehicle contained alcohol, controlled substances, or paraphernalia, he did not have the legal 
authority to submit the driver of the vehicle to the extraneous questions. Consequently, even 
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though these questions took only a few seconds to ask, the officer had overstepped his 
constitutional authority by extending the purpose of the stop to interrogate the driver on unrelated 
matters. 
In the present case, Trooper Singleton stopped Mr. Mondragon for going seven miles per 
hour over the speed limit and for changing lanes without using a turn signal. As a result of his 
observation of these alleged infractions, the officer had authority only to "request a driver's license 
and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation." Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519; 
Walker, 933 F.2d at 815. Mr. Mondragon produced his driver's license and registration. (R. 7). 
The Trooper then had authority to run a computer check and issue a citation. The record is void 
of any evidence that the Trooper ever made a computer check or issued a citation for the offense 
which justified the stop. As soon as the Trooper had taken possession of Mr. Mondragon's 
driver's license and registration, the Trooper expanded the scope of the stop to investigate "a 
burnt smell. . . similar to tobacco." (R. 7). From this point the Trooper never returned to the 
purpose of the stop to run a computer check and to issue a citation for speeding and failure to 
signal. The Trooper could lawfully deviate from this limited scope only if "(1) during the course 
of the traffic stop the officer acquire[d] an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the 
driver [was] engaged in illegal activity, or (2) the driver voluntarily consented] to the officer's 
additional questioning." Sandoval 29 F.3d at 540. 
A. TROOPER SINGLETON DID NOT HAVE AN "OBJECTIVELY 
REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION" THAT THE 
TRUNK OR DUFFEL BAG CONTAINED CONTRABAND. 
"Under the fourth amendment, a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when the 
officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation, or when the officer has a reasonable 
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articulable suspicion that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime, such as transporting 
drugs." State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1997) (Citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1132; State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct.App.1994); and State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 
882 (Utah Ct.App. 1989.)) Furthermore, reasonable suspicion "is based on objective facts . . . 
which are given due weight in light of the reliability of the information . . . and the reasonable 
inferences drawn from those facts . . . " State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 141, (Utah App. 1997) 
(citing Nguyen, 878 P.2d at 1186; White, 496 U.S. 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416; and State v. Roth, 
827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
According to the Trooper's testimony, he allegedly smelled the odor of "fresh" burnt 
tobacco as he spoke with the driver of the vehicle, Mr. Mondragon. (R. 22). Mr. Mondragon 
disputes that this allegation gave the Trooper an "objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion" 
that illegal activity was occurring sufficient to authorize the trooper to deviate from the purposes 
of the stop and investigate the presence of tobacco. Nevertheless, even assuming that the 
Trooper had authority to perform this unrelated investigation based upon his observation of an 
odor of fresh tobacco smoke, this authority would have ended when, as the Trooper testified, he 
was told that one of the passengers was nineteen. (R. 7). Moreover, any authority the Trooper 
may have had to perform this unrelated investigation would have ended when the Trooper found 
and examined the identification card of one of the passengers which showed that the individual 
was ofage to possess tobacco. (R. 16). Instead, the Trooper chose to disregard the evidence of 
the age of the passenger and searched the passenger compartment for tobacco. The Trooper 
failed to uncover any tobacco in the passenger compartment of the car. (R. 22). 
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Furthermore, after expanding the scope of the detention to investigate the source of an 
odor of tobacco, the Trooper further expanded the scope of the detention and refused to return to 
the purpose which justified the stop. During the search of the passenger compartment, the 
Trooper noticed spare light bulbs in the glove compartment. The Trooper then ordered Mr. 
Mondragon to "pop the trunk," ostensibly, at least, to assist in repairing the taillights with those 
bulbs the Trooper had observed. (R. 12). Unquestionably, the Trooper did not have authority to 
demand that the trunk be opened in order to inspect the taillights. His authority regarding the 
taillight infraction is merely to choose whether to write a ticket or not. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 
1519; Walker, 933 F.2d at 815. Whether or not the Trooper could assist in repairing the 
taillights had absolutely no bearing on whether or not a signal infraction had occurred, as the 
occurrence of an infraction had already been determined when the Trooper allegedly observed the 
vehicle change lanes without signaling. Therefore, the Trooper's demand that the trunk be opened 
was yet another deviation from the initial scope of the stop. The Trooper's demand that the trunk 
be opened was neither based upon any reasonable suspicion nor upon any objective facts that the 
trunk contained contraband. 
After Mr. Mondragon had complied with the Trooper's demand and had opened the trunk, 
the Trooper, yet again, expanded the scope of the stop by turning his attention from inspecting the 
taillights to a duffel bag contained in the trunk. (R. 12). And, yet again, the Trooper did not have 
authority to investigate the duffel bag. The Trooper had no objectively reasonable and articulable 
suspicion sufficient to deviate from the purpose of the stop. The Trooper could not see anything 
that would indicate the bag contained contraband; he did not smell anything to indicate that the 
bag contained contraband; and he did not discover anything that would indicate the bag contained 
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contraband. Therefore, unless Mr. Mondragon had consented to this and the previous extensions 
of his detention, the Trooper did not have the legal authority to deviate from the limited purposes 
of the traffic stop to extend the detention to question the passengers, search the passengers, 
search the passenger compartment, order that the trunk be opened to inspect the lights, inquire 
into the ownership of the bag, the contents of the bag, or whether he could search the bag. And, 
as will be shown below, consent was neither asked for nor given. 
B. MR. MONDRAGON DID NOT GIVE HIS CONSENT TO THE 
EXTENSION OF THE SCOPE AND LENGTH OF THE TRAFFIC 
STOP. 
As stated previously, the Trooper could lawfully deviate from the limited scope of the 
traffic stop only if "(1) during the course of the traffic stop the officer acquire[d] an objectively 
reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver [was] engaged in illegal activity, or (2) the driver 
voluntarily consented] to the officer's additional questioning." Sandoval 29F.3dat540. As 
already shown, the Trooper had absolutely no articulable suspicion to justify any action beyond 
requesting the license and registration, completing an NCIC. computer check, and issuing a 
citation for the observed speeding and signaling offenses. Therefore, unless Mr. Mondragon 
voluntarily consented to the Trooper's additional requests, questions, and searches, the evidence 
seized as a result of them must be suppressed. 
"The government bears the burden on establishing consent, and voluntariness is a question 
of fact to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Mota. 864 
F.Supp. 1123 (D. Wyo. 1994) rdting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227-32 (1973)). 
The Supreme Court has further stated that "in order to determine whether a particular encounter 
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constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to 
determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the 
person was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." 
Florida v. Bostick. 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (quoted in Sandoval, 29 F.3d at 540). 
Under Utah law, even after an illegal search "it is possible to admit the evidence recovered 
as a result of the search . . .if both prongs of a two-part test are satisfied: (1) the consent was 
voluntarily given, . . . and (2) the consent was not obtained through 'exploitation' of the prior 
illegal police conduct." State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Thurman. 
846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990)). 
First, Mondragon's consent could not have been voluntary. Mondragon could not have 
felt free to terminate the encounter with Trooper Singleton under the circumstances confronting 
him at the time of the Trooper's initial request to search the passenger compartment. The 
Trooper had not even come close to finishing the legitimate purposes of the stop. The only action 
the Trooper had taken toward completing the purpose of the stop was to take possession of 
Mondragon's driver's license and registration. The Trooper had not given Mondragon a citation; 
the Trooper had not returned Mondragon's driver's license or registration; and the Trooper had 
not told Mondragon that he was free to leave. Furthermore, the Trooper testified that he "asked 
Mr. Mondragon to pop the trunk." (R. 12). The Trooper then observed that Mondragon 
"hesitated at first, then opened the trunk." (R. 12). Clearly, Trooper Singleton's implication is 
that Mr. Mondragon did not want to open the trunk but did anyway to comply with the Trooper's 
demand. Thus, the nonconsensual nature of the detention-and all the extensions thereof-cannot 
be mistaken as a valid consent. 
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Other courts have concluded that officers lacked consent to extend the scope of a traffic 
stop on much less evidence than exists in this case. For example, in Sandoval the officer had 
placed defendant in his patrol car where he explained the need to obey the speed limit and then 
returned the defendant's documents. The defendant then asked the officer, "that's it?" 
Whereupon the officer replied, "no, might a minute." 29 F.3rd at 538-39. The court held that, 
under these circumstances f,[n]o one . . . can reasonably view himself or herself as free to leave 
the patrol car." Id at 542. The court further explained, "at no point did the nature of [the 
officer's] inquiries change the climate so that the reasonable listener would view participation in 
the exchange as freely terminable by leaving the patrol car." Id 
In Mota, the officer returned the defendant's documents before asking them if they had 
any drugs, guns, or large amounts of cash in the vehicle. However, the courts found that a 
voluntary encounter had still not arisen because "there were simply no words nor gestures of 
closure from which a reasonable listener could have determined that the reason for detention was 
over and a consensual encounter was beginning." 864 F.Supp. at 1128. "The patrolman did not 
pause in the conversation, he did not say anything to indicate his task was finished, and he did not 
move his body away from its leaning position on the [car]." Id "Any reasonable listener, in fact 
any decent person, would not have felt free to go about his or her business if that meant driving 
away and injuring the person leaning up against their car." Id 
In the present case, Trooper Singleton had still not completed his duties relating to the 
traffic stop. He had not written a ticket; he had maintained possession of Mondragon's 
documents; and he had not told them they were free to leave. Thus, the constitutional violation in 
this case is much clearer even than those in Sandoval and Mota. In both of those cases, the 
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officer had finished writing the ticket and had returned the drivers' documents. Therefore, 
Trooper Singleton gave Mondragon absolutely no indications that the encounter had become 
consensual, and that Mondragon could leave. Since it is illegal to drive without one's license in 
one's possession, no reasonable citizen would consider leaving under the circumstances the 
Trooper posed for Mondragon. And, of course, it is beyond dispute that the Trooper did not ask 
Mondragon's permission to extend the scope of the stop to investigate the trunk of the car. 
Therefore, the Trooper clearly did not obtain Mondragon's consent to the unconstitutional 
deviations from the authorized purposes of the stop. 
Second, as noted above, the only action the Trooper had taken toward completing the 
initial purpose of the stop was to take possession of Mondragon's driver's license and registration. 
Even if Mr. Mondragon had given a valid consent to the search, the State must prove that the 
consent was not invalidated by the Trooper's misconduct in expanding the scope of the stop. The 
State can meet this burden by showing that Mondragon's "consent cannot have been the product 
of police exploitation . . . 'or in other words "whether the 'taint' of the Fourth amendment 
violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.'" State v. Bello. 871 
P.2d 584, 588 (Utah App. 1994). If the search was neither based upon a reasonable articulable 
suspicion, nor valid consent, then there are three factors to consider in determining whether the 
taint of the Fourth amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the 
evidence: "(1) the 'purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,' (2) the 'temporal proximity' 
of the illegality and the consent,' and (3) 'the presence of intervening circumstances."' State v. 
Zeigleman. 905 P.2d 883, (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 691 n. 4 (citing 
Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). 
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In the present case, Trooper Singleton's purpose in stopping Mr. Mondragon was to issue 
citations for driving seven miles-per-hour over the speed limit and for failing to signal prior to a 
lane change. As to the first attenuation factor, Mondragon contends that the flagrancy of the 
Trooper's misconduct is apparent: Under the circumstances which the Trooper searched 
Mondragon's car, any citizen whose daily routine may bring him into contact with a tobacco 
smoker and whom is in the presence of a minor would be subject to whatever search the Trooper 
cared to undertake. Again, cigarette ashes on the floor of a car driven by a grandparent taking his 
grandchild to lunch would provide grounds for a search of the entire vehicle and the persons 
therein. Such a conclusion shocks the conscience. As to the second attenuation factor, once the 
Trooper obtained Mondragon's driver's license and registration, the Trooper undertook his search 
for tobacco without undertaking any action toward completing the purpose of the stop. No time 
transpired between the Trooper's failure to complete the purpose of the stop and the searches. 
When he approached Mondragon and had obtained the license and registration, the Trooper did 
not initially ask about the traffic violations but instead chose to search the vehicle for tobacco. 
Once the Trooper failed to find tobacco in the passenger compartment, he did not check the 
license and registration for validity but chose to continue searching the vehicle without consent by 
commanding Mondragon to "pop the trunk." There was only an instant of time between the 
illegal expanding of the scope of the stop and Mondragon's alleged consent to search the 
passenger compartment. However, there was no consent either requested or obtained to search 
the trunk. As to the third attenuation factor, there were no intervening circumstances. 
In addition, since the State failed to prove probable cause or exigent circumstances, the 
Trooper's violation of Mondragon's article I, section 14, Utah Constitutional rights demands 
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"exclusion of illegally obtained evidence [a]s a necessary consequence . . ." State v. Larocco. 794 
P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App. 1994). 
POINT III 
(Appellants Cutler and Manzanares only) 
THE INTERROGATION AND SEARCH OF CUTLER AND 
MANZANARES WAS INTRUSIVE, BEYOND THE SCOPE 
OF THE STOP, WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND A 
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
The interrogation and search of Appellants Cutler and Manzanares was intrusive, beyond 
the scope of the stop, without probable cause and a violation of their constitutional rights against 
unlawful search and seizure. 
Utah case law establishes that an officer cannot intrude on a passenger of a vehicle unless 
the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Golina-Luna. 826 
P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992) (once officer determined passengers of vehicle, pulled over for 
possible intoxication, were sober, officer exceeded authority by interrogating defendants without 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity). In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 
(Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court found that a warrants check on a passenger was 
unreasonable if the officer had not formed a reasonable articulable suspicion that the passenger 
was engaged in any criminal activity. 
In the present case, the Trooper believed he smelled the odor of fresh burnt tobacco. (R. 
22). The Trooper testified that according to Mondragon's identification, Mondragon was not old 
enough to possess tobacco. (R. 7). The Trooper inquired if anyone else in the car was old 
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enough to smoke. One of the Appellants stated that Cutler was old enough to possess tobacco. 
(R. 7). 
The Trooper did not end his inquiry (see Point II), but the Trooper proceeded to search the 
vehicle for "contraband." When the Trooper frisked Cutler, he found a wallet and opened it to 
reveal a drivers license with a birth date of June, 6, 1972, making Cutler twenty three (23) years 
of age. The Trooper testified that he did not know what age Cutler was because the Trooper's 
math skills were not very good. (R. 16). The Trooper, while maintaining possession of Cutler's 
identification asked Cutler if he had any warrants. Cutler replied that he though he had one out of 
Salt Lake County. (R. 30). After Cutler was frisked, Cutler was ordered to the front of the 
vehicle and was not free to leave. (R. 33). 
The Trooper inquired about Manzanares' identification. Manzanares did not have 
identification on him. However, the Trooper asked Manzanares if he had any warrants 
outstanding. Once Manzanares was frisked he was ordered to the front of the vehicle and was not 
free to leave. (R. 33) 
In the above incidents the Trooper violated established Utah case law that prohibits an 
officer from intruding on passengers without reasonable articulable suspicion. In Johnson the 
Supreme Court stated "the leap from asking for the passengers name and date of birth to running 
a warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific and articulable facts 
and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
hunch." State v.Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, (Utah 1991), Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
The Appellants were passengers in a car driven by Appellant Mondragon. The Trooper 
pulled the car over for speeding and failure to signal, both valid traffic violations. However, the 
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Trooper expanded the scope of the stop immediately, see Point II. The Trooper did not have an 
articulable suspicion of serious criminal activity. What the Trooper had was a suspicion or hunch. 
The Trooper ignored the case law that governs traffic stops, for his suspicion or hunch. A 
practice that is in direct opposition to the case law established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Johnson. 
Under Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution Appellants' protection against 
warrantless searches were violated. The Utah Supreme Court established that a passenger has a 
right from warrantless searches and seizures. Johnson. In this case the Trooper violated the 
Appellants' rights. The Trooper had no articulable suspicion of a criminal activity, when he 
discovered Appellant Cutler was of age to possess tobacco. Further, the contraband of tobacco 
that the Trooper was searching for no longer existed since Appellant Cutler was of age to possess 
tobacco. Therefore, under Larocco the Trooper could not proceed against the Appellants, there 
was neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances, both being necessary for a warrantless 
search. The Trooper's intrusive actions violated the Appellants' rights under Article I Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution, all evidence from the search, arrest and interrogations should be 
excluded. State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990) (Plurality opinion). 
The Trooper's detention of the Appellants beyond what was reasonably related in scope to 
the traffic stop was not justified by an articulable suspicion that the Appellants had committed a 
crime or were engaged in any criminal activity. Both the Appellants' Fourth amendment rights 
were violated, and the evidence obtained pursuant to the arrest should be suppressed. 
22 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact from the trial court could not be supported by the weight of evidence 
that was presented. The findings of fact should be found erroneous and reversed. 
Trooper Singleton only had authority to obtain identification, run a computer check, and 
write a traffic citation. The Trooper unconstitutionally deviated from this authorized scope when 
he demanded that Mr. Mondragon open the trunk and, more especially, when he interrogated Mr. 
Mondragon regarding the ownership of the bag, its contents, and whether he would let the 
Trooper search it. As the Trooper did not have an objectively reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to support this additional intrusion and detention, and as the Trooper did not obtain Mr 
Mondragon's valid consent, the fruits of the illegal intrusion and detention must now be 
suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree, Wong Sun. 371 U.S. 471 (1963), "without sufficient 
attenuation" to allow admission of the evidence, State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App. 
1994) and as "a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14" of the Utah 
Constitution. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990). 
Further, the Trooper immediately focused his attention on the passengers Cutler and 
Manzanares. The Trooper's intrusive questioning and searches violated the passengers rights 
against warrantless search and seizure. State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). As such any 
and all evidence from such intrusion and detention must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous 
tree. Wong. Under Utah case law, evidence obtained from the Trooper's misconduct that 
resulted in the intrusive search and seizure of the Appellants must be excluded. State v. Bello. 
871 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App. 1994), State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990). 
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A. After 1300 hours. 1330, around that time. 
Q. Do you recall the weather conditions? 
A. It was warm, dry. 
Q . And did all this occur in Box Elder County? 
A. Yes, sir, it did. 
Q. You were working that day, I assume? 
A. Yes, sir, I was. 
Q. In a marked car and wearing a uniform? 
A. That is correct. 
O. And I think this all started when you had 
occasion to pull over a vehicle that was ultimately 
found to contain these three individuals, one of them 
as the driver and two as passengers? 
A. Yes, sir. 
O. Was there anyone else in the vehicle? 
A. No, sir. 
0. What brought your attention to the vehicle? 
A. I had just pulled up on the interstate, back 
on the interstate. I noticed the vehicle traveling in 
front of me. It was moving faster than the rest of 
the traffic. We were doing a saturation on Interstate 
15 through a project with other states. We were 
stopping, you know, as many violators as we could to 
see if we could aet the accident rate down in that 24 








consider that throughout. We can argue that in 
closing. Just so I don't lose track of it. We take 
the position that at least two out of the three don't 
have standing. At the moment I'm not certain which o 
the two it would be. The third one may not. 
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Thank you. I'll call Scott 
Singleton to the stand. 
SCOTT SINGLETON, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn to tell 
the truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. BUNDERSON 
14 I O. Your name is Scott Singleton and you are a 
15 I trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol, is that correct? 
16 A. That is correct. 
17 O. I'll call your attention to the matter before 
18 thfi court and I guess I could almost just say tell us 
19 what happened, because you've gone through at least 
20 one preliminary hearing and prepared a couple of times 
21 to testify for this hearing, is that correct? 
22 A. That is correct. 
23 O. What date did this occur on? 
24 A. September 22nd, 1995. 
25 O. The time of dav? 
1 
2 
So I noticed the vehicle was moving faster 
than the rest of the traffic as it pulled onto the 













pacing at 72 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour 
zone. That's when it moved from the left lane into 
the right lane and it moved abruptly, without 
s i anal1ing. 
O. Where was this? 
A. This was -- it first originated just south of 
the Perry rest area. And just before the Port of 
Entry the vehicle -- the vehicle stop occurred just a 
little bit north of the Port of Entry. 
0. Did you effect the vehicle stop right after 
the left to right abrupt lane change? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did the vehicle pull over in a regular 









A. Yes, it pulled over to the right as it was 
S U D O O S ed to. 
0. All right. Describe what happened from that 
po int. 
A. As I stopped it I only saw one occupant in 
the vehicle at first. As it stopped I noticed two 














vehicle, went up and approached the driver. I asked 
for identification., driver's license, registration. 
Both documents were produced. 
Q. Who was the driver? 
A. The driver was Mr. Mondragon over here. 
Q. To whom was the car registered? 
A. It was in his name also. 
Q. Okay. I may have neglected to ask this, or I 
didn't ask it. Which direction was the car traveling? 
A. Sou thbound. 
0. All right. Go ahead. 
A. And as I was talking with the driver I could 
smell a burnt smell comina from the vehicle. It was 
14 similar to tobacco. I asked if -- I could see by Mr. 
15 Mondragon's driver's license that he wasn't old enough 
16 to possess tobacco. 
17 Q. His age is what? 
18 A. 19. I asked who was 19 in the vehicle and 
19 they claimed — it was claimed that Mr. Cutler, I 
20 don't remember exactly who said it, but Mr. Cutler was 
21 19 somebody said. That was brought to my attention. 
22 I asked if he had any identification to show that he 
23 was of that age and he said he didn't have any. 
24 O. Did Mr. Cutler at that time look to you like 























A. No. You know, to me he looks close to the 
age. Whether he could have been over or under, it was 
close . 
Q. But in looking at him he could have been 
under 19? 
A. If I were selling tobacco in the store I 
would definitely ID him because I couldn't tell one 
way or the other. 
Q. Okay. What happened next? 
A. I asked if there were any -- if they had 
tobacco in the vehicle, because it was really a strong, 
fresh burnt smell. They said that they didn't, but 
someone in the car had been smoking the night before. 
I asked if I could have permission to look 
in the car for tobacco. The driver consented and said 
i t was fine. 
0. At this point where are all of these 
individuals? 
A. Mr. Mondragon is in the driver's seat; Mr. 
Manzanares is on the passenger side; then Mr. Cutler 
behind the driver in the back seat* 
O. So nobody is out of the car at this point? 
A. No. So then I did a terry frisk on them one 
at a time for weapons. I didn't find any. When I was 




A. Yes, According to Mr* Cutler the front ones 
worked and the rear ones didn't. That was different. 
We started to discuss about either the bulbs or the 
fuses. I noticed that they had bulbs for the turn 
signals in the glove box. I asked Mr. Mondragon to 
pop the trunk and we'd check out the bulbs. That's 
when I first noticed a tension, the way he paused, the 
way his posture changed. I could tell something was 
wrong. 
He started a statement about the fuses. I 















see. you know, if we can fix those. We went back to 
the trunk and he popped the trunk. We tried to 
examine the bulbs but you needed a tool, more than 
what I had access to, to be able to get to where the 
bulbs are. 
We had some discussion about the bulbs, 
that we couldn't get the bulbs out. And at the time I 
also noticed a green duffel bag there in the trunk. 
Q. Let me ask you, up to this point had you made 
it clear that the vehicle wasn't going to drive back 
down the road without the taillights fixed? 
A. I didn ' t . 
0. You hadn't said anything about that? 











back in the vehicle while I was going to go back. 
That's how come the discussion about the bulbs. The 
vehicle is not going to go down the road without any 
taillights or brake lights or signal lights. 
Q. That's what you were thinking, but you didn' 
express that yet? 
A. No, I hadn't. 
Q. And there was a green duffel bag in the 
trunk ? 
A. Yes. 
0. And that's here on the table today? 
A. Yes. It struck me as odd that that was in 






was really an absence of any kind of luggage or 
anything. They'd gone to Pocatello to drop off a 
friend and were on their way back. That really struck 
me as odd, because, I mean, there was nothing else put 
in the trunk exceot for this one areen duffel baa and 







coat and a blanket and that: was it. 
I asked about the duffel bag, whose it 
was. Mr. Mondragon said that it belonged to 
everybody. They put their clothes in it on the way up 
to Idaho. I asked if there was any tobacco or 











and the absolute absence of any smoking material in 
the driver's compartment, you know, it then made sense 
that the cigarettes could possibly be put there. So I 
asked if I could look in the duffel bag and he said, 
you know, that it was okay. He indicated that it was 
okay . 
I had him step around the side of the 
vehicle and I unzipped the bag and when I unzipped the 
bag I could see a plastic sack and I could see what 
appeared to be a large quantity of marijuana. 
Q. And indeed it turned out to be marijuana, is 
12 that correct? 
13 A. Ye s, sir. 
14 Q. And there were other items, drug type items, 
15 in the duffel bag, I believe, is that correct? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. That's the basis of these charges? 
18 A. That is correct, yes, sir. 
19 Q. Is there anything we've charged them with 
20 that wasn't in the duffel bag? 
21 A. Yes. Well, as far as that question, no. I 
22 didn't charge them with anything that wasn't found in 
23 the duffel bag. There were — I'll explain. There 
24 were stamps, which turned out to be LSD, that were in 
25 I the duffel bag, but they were in a pair of pants that 
1 I was separate from the rest of the items in the bag. 
2 | Q. Okay. As far as the search and seizure issue 
3 | goes, you were focused on the duffel bag? 
4 | A. Yes, sir. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Your Honor, for the purpose of 
this hearing I think we've completed our testimony. 
7 | Just to follow through, of course, the charges are 







THE COURT: All right. Cross-examination. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you. At this time I intend 
to use the videotape of the stop to assist me in my 
ques tions. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 














What I'm going to do, can you see this 
Yes. Not wonderfully, but I can see it okay 
How about if I turn it a little bit more? 
How is that? 
A. That's bet ter. 
O. What we'll do is roll this tape and I'm going 
to pause it at certain sections and ask you some 
questions. It's a short tape. When I'm done with it 


























MR. BUNDERSON: It was a videotape made at the 
scene. We stipulate that this is Officer Singleton's 
videotape of some portions of the event. I'm not sure 
when it begins and ends. We made a copy and provided 
it to defense counsel. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: By the way, I'm not asking that 
the content, the verbal content of the tape, be 
recorded by the court reporter. 
THE COURT: I'll ask the reporter to simply 
record your questions and the witness's answers, but 
not the contents of the tape. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Are you going to mark the tape 
itself? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: When I'm done we'll do that. 
(Tape piayed.) 
Q. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) At this point you 
discovered or were able to ascertain that Casey Cutler 
was of legal age to possess tobacco? 
A. I discovered a driver's license, but I didn't 
really check the age. My math skills are not that 
good. It takes me quite a while to figure out what 19 
i s . 
Q. We just heard a portion there, after you 


























Q. So you didn't have a conversation right ther 
about anything? 
A. No. Not that I can remember, no. 
Q. Thank you . 
(Resume playing the tape.) 
Q. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) You pulled them over for 
speeding and for a turn signal violation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And in the course of questioning them you 
smelled the burnt tobacco? 
A. A burnt smell which I assumed was tobacco, 
yes . 
Q. You asked them if there was any tobacco in 
the car? 
A. Yes. 
O. And you asked to search and did a search? 
A. Yes, sir. 
O And found no tobacco? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. 
(Resume playing the tape.) 
Q. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) Let's stop it there. Do 
you recall him saying, and I couldn't hear it clearly, 
but he clearlv hesitated there when vou asked him to 
25 D O D the trunk? 
A. Uh-huh. 
2 I Q. And did he not say something about getting it 
3 | checked in Salt Lake? 
4 I A . I honestly don't recall. 
5 Q. You don't recall him saying that? 
6 A . I do not. 
7 Q. Let me rewind this real quick. I thought I 
8 heard it previously. Maybe I'm mistaken. 
9 (Resume playing the tape.) 
10 O. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) You don't recall what he 
















I don * t recall 
0. You couldn't hear it? 
A. I might have heard, but I don't recall it 
now . 
Q. But he clearly didn't say okay, I'll pop the 
trunk, at that point? 
A . No . 
(Resume playing the tape.) 
0. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) Right there, just so we 
can describe for the record, Mr. Mondragon popped the 
trunk? 
A. Yes . 
0. And you were standing at the left rear --
excuse me, the right rear corner? 
Pa n& 1 Q 
A. Yes. 
O . And he was to your left? 
A. Ye s , sir. 
0. And you popped the trunk and you both poked 
your heads into the trunk? 
A. Uh-huh. 
O 
















And looked at the right taillight box, 
Tha t *s correct 
0. And at that point you could see it would be 
difficult to access? 
A. Yes, sir. 
O. That's why you said something like what? 
A. That we'd have to tear the sucker apart. 
That's why I moved to the left side to see if it was 
the s ame . 
O. Could you tell if — you said we'll have to 
tear the sucker apart. Did he say anything? 
A. No, not that I remember. 
O. So you're the only one who said anything 
there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was no discussion about the taillight? 
A. No. Well, yeah, he said something about not 



























the statement, yeah, you'll have to tear the sucker 
apart. 
Q. Okay. And then you immediately moved around 
to Mr. Mondragon's left, is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir . 
0. And you looked into the trunk and you had a 
better view from the left? 
A. A better view? 
Q. Of the trunk area. 
A. A better view of the left side. As far as 
the whole trunk goes, see, right in the very center of 
the trunk was a large speaker box. That consumed a 
lot of the center area of the trunk. 
Q. Was that blocking your view of the duffel 
bag? 
A. No. I could see the duffel bag when it was 
opened. 
Q. You saw the duffel bag when you were on Mr. 
Mondragon's right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you moved around to his left? 
A. When it was originally popped open I could 
see the speaker box and I saw part of the duffel bag. 
O. And at this point you asked him whose duffel 








A . Yes. sir. 




















duffel bag to repair the taillights? 
A. No. I was thinking, you know, because we had 
the strong smell and not even a cigarette butt in the 
vehicle, you know, that there was a possibility that 
contraband might be concealed back there. 
Q. And you testified earlier that when -- that 
you stopped the car and I assume they had the window 
rolled down when you were talking to them? 
A. Ye s, sir. 
Q. You noticed a fresh smell? 
A. It was a recently burnt smell. 
Q. You testified earlier that it was fresh? 
A. Yes. Rather than something that had been 
stale. I smoked for a lot of years. You get in a car 
and they have that stale old smoke odor. This was 
fresh, you know. 
Q. So you assumed at that point that they'd been 
smoking in the vehicle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Despite your search of the passenger 
compartment, you found no tobacco? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. When you saw the duffel bag in the trunk, it 
Page 22 
wa s c1osed ? 
2 A. Yes, sir. 
3 0 . Did it have a zipper on it? 
4 A. Yes, sir. 
5 O. Did it have any kind of logo on it? 
6 A. McGregor, I believe, was the logo. 
7 Q. Let me back up. You retrieved from the 
8 driver, Mondragon, his driver's license and 
9 registration, correct? 
10 A. Yes, sir, that's correct. 
11 0. Did those prove to be valid? 
12 A. Ye s, sir. 
13 O. You had pulled him over for speeding and a 
14 signal violation? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 O. At the point that you determined his driver' 
17 license and registration were valid, could you have 
18 issued a citation at that point? 
19 A. When I determined that they were valid? 
20 Q. Yes. 
21 A. Yes, I could have issued a citation. 
22 Q. Okay. At the point you concluded the search 
23 of the passenger compartment and found no tobacco, 
24 could you have concluded -- could you have issued a 
25 citation for the speeding and turn signal violation? 






















A. Yes, sir, I could have. 
Q. Mr. Mondragon didn't appear to be impaired in 
a ny way? 
A. No, sir, 
O. As far as you could tell from watching the 
videotape, at this point had you returned back to your 
squad car ? 
A. No, sir, T hadn't yet. 
O. You hadn't? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So you were still holding the identification 
of Mr. Cutler? 
A. Yes, sir. 
O. As well as Mr. Mondragon's driver's license? 
A. And registration, yes, sir. 
Q. And at the point that you are here, this 
point here, where you have the trunk open and you're 
asking about the duffel bag, you actually have their 
identification? 
A. Yes, sir. 
O. Clearly they were not free to leave? 
A. They wouldn't be free to leave, even if they 
had their items back, because of the mechanical 
condition of the vehicle. 


















true that -- I'll go through Mr* Manzanares first. 
You performed a pat down on him? 
A . That's correct. 
0. And it is true after the pat down you ordered 
him to go around and stand in front of the car, is 
that correc t ? 
A, That's correct. 
0. Okay. It's true that at that time he was not 
free to leave? 
A. At that time, no. 
Q. Okay. And is it also true that you expected 
him to stay there in front of the car? 
A. That is correct, yes, sir. I mean, yes, 
ma ' am. 
0. That's okay. And it's also true that you 
performed a pat down of Mr. Cutler, is that correct? 
A. Yes, ma'am, it is. 
And on that you found a wallet? 
Yes, ma'am. 
And you asked him to open it up? 
Yes . 
And there was ID in it? 
That is correct. 
Q. And at that point you stated that you took 
possession of his ID, is that correct? 
1 your pocket along with Mr. Mondragon's? 
2 A. I placed them in my pocket. I'm not sure 
3 exactly — 
4 Q. It was all in your possession? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q # And you ordered Mr. Cutler to go in front of 
7 the car also? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q # And Mr. Cutler was not free to go at that 
10 time? 
11 A m Especially not when he told me he had a 
12 warran t. 
13 Q
 # Okay. Let's go back to that. You asked him 
14 if he had a warrant? 
15 A. That * s correct. 
16 Q^ And you asked him if he had warrants after 
17 you took possession of his driver's license, is that 
18 correct? 
19 A. While I had possession, yes. 
20 Q. You didn't return the driver's license? 
21 A. No, ma'am, I did not. 
22 Qm And was he cooperative with you? 
23 1 A. Yes. 
24 I Q . in fact, looking at the video, it seems like 
2 5
 I all three defendants were quite cooperative? 
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l| A. I didn't find any and I don't: recall h i m 
2 | pointing it out. I remember it being denied that 
there was any in the vehicle. 
4 I Q. Okay. And you requested Mr. Manzanares and 
5 I Mr. Cutler, as well as Mr. Mondragon, to return to the 
6 I vehicle after you searched it? 
7 A . Yes . 
8 0. And your search resulted in no type of 
9 contraband? 
10 A. There wasn't anything. 
11 0. And at that point, when you returned them 
12 back to the vehicle, you had possession of Mr. 
13 Cutler's ID and Mr. Mondragon's ID? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Mr. Manzanares didn't have ID, but you did 
16 request that information? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Why was that requested? 
19 A. So I could check for validity, see if he was 
20 who he was and if he had any warrants. 
21 Q. Is there any reason — isn't it true that you 
22 had no articuable suspicion to believe that Mr. 
23 Manzanares had done anything criminal? 
24 A. There was nothing. He had no identification 

























was who he said he was. 
Q. Okay. But there was -- you had no suspicion 
of criminal activity on Mr. Manzanares? 
A. Not at the time, no. 
Q. And other than the warrant that Mr. Cutler 
had stated, you had no suspicion of criminal activity 
at that point concerning him? 
A. No . 
Q. At that point you could have went back and 
checked the NCIC on Mr. Mondragon come back and 
written a citation, correct? 
A. I could have. To state it correctly, I could 
have checked the information and written the citation. 
Q. Okay. It's also true that you did not return 
Mr. Cutler's ID at any time, is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
MS. BRIDGESS: I'm sure Mr. Bouwhuis wants to, 
but I would, Your Honor, like to also request that the 
tape be admitted as evidence for Mr. Cutler and Mr. 
Manzanares. 
THE COURT: Do we have it marked yet? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: No. I neglected to do that, Your 
Honor. 
MR. BUNDERSON: I have no objection. 
25 THE COURT: I'll ask the clerk to mark it as 
ADDENDUM B 
577 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XVIII, § 1 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1 [Slavery prohibited ] 
2 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction 
gee 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 




1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection ] 
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment ] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office J 
4 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid ] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Section 1. [Cit izenship — Due process of l aw — Equal 
protect ion. ] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws 
'^  
Sec, 2. [Representat ives — P o w e r to reduce appoint-
ment . ] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
^whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
ktaxed But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
vof electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
^States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cal Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
„being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
^ 1 1 be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
Sjgje citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
gfenty-one years of age in such State 
f c* 3. [Disqualif ication to hold office.] \o person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, FV* Etedw of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
ffiSlpr military, under the United States, or under any State, 
E ^ h a v i n g previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
Jfi§?» or1 as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
j ^ S i a t e legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
jffJSUtej to support the Constitution of the United States, 
spJ^Kave engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
5§PJ*Tor given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But 
^rfeess may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
^ a b i l i t y 
[Publ ic debt not to be ques t ioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and c la ims not to be paid.] 
^validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
Py law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave, 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1 [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify ] 
2 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Section 1. [Right of c i t izens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the Umted States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 




The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration 
AMENDMENT XVII 
[Election of senators.] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years, and each Senator shall have one vote The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
m the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933 SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION 1 ] 
Section 
1 [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors ] 
2 [Concurrent power to enforce amendment ] 
3 [Time limit for adoption ] 
Sect ion 1. [National prohibit ion — Intox ica t ing li-
quors.] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
withm, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law 1988 (2nd s s ) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not 
be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons In other cases the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but m no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous In civil cases three 
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him m his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without demal or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a p a r t y 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself, a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy fbr the same offense 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by s tatute Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by s tatute or rule 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden 
ance of warrant.] £<| 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hou 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sen 
shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but ujj 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particula 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing | 
be seized * 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — LibeL 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedoino 
speech or of the press In all criminal prosecutions for libel t 
t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it sh_ 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true! 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable end 
the party shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the i 
to determine the law and the fact 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] J 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except m cases of 
absconding debtors \#f 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] *j 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or mihtar^ 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the^ 
right of suffrage Soldiers in time of war, may vote at their* 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act 1896^ 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be m strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without jus t compensation 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation 
1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people l99* 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory an" 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise 1896 
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section (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a 
third degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty 
not to exceed $5,000. 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall 
be deposited in the General Fund. 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit 
information to the database as required under this section 
after the division has submitted a specific written request 
for the information or when the division determines the 
individual has a demonstrable pat tern of failing to submit 
the information as required is grounds for the division to 
take the following actions in accordance with Section 
58-1-401: 
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation 
the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the 
individual; 
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted, 
lb) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection la)Vvi) 
shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 53-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
civilly liable for having submitted the information. 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shall be funded by 
appropriations from the General Fund. 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated with-
out the use of any resources within the Commerce Service 
Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drug outlet. 1096 
58-37-8. Prohibi ted ac t s — Pena l t i e s . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalt ies: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d tha t is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a par t of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions tha t are under taken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
JJ-r 
person occupies a position of organizer, supers 
sor^ or any other position of management. && 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (jftv 
with respect to: ><jt 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II fa 
controlled substance analog is guilty of a secoitf 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent co&. 
viction is guilty of a first degree felony; *': * 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV/o* 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upbo 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or J5i 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guiltyof 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony^ 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: -^ 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally t£ 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it vraT 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized'ny 
this subsection; * 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to' 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-| 
stances in any of those locations; . J 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mari-
juana , if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog,w 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the ft)*"111 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, ana 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating SubsectioQ 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of poss^s" 
sion of any controlled substance by a person, tha t pers o n 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) wtfk 
respect to all other controlled substances not included & 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than ofle 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor-
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent convicti^n 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsecti0n 
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
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(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attemptmg to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
} is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of 
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not less than five years if the penalty that would other-
wise have been established but for this subsection would 
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the indi-
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred 
was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty 
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
m addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra-
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evi-
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
of the substance or substances. 
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under 
this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1997 
58-37-8.5. Applicability of Title 76 prosecutions under 
this chapter. 
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters 
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this 
chapter. 1997 
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ADDENDUM C 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs 
CASEY J. CUTLER 
ELMER R. MONDRAGON, JR. j 
RONNIE J. MANZANARES | 
Defendants ! 
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1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
j AND ORDER 
CASE NOS. 951000128 
961000027 
951000129 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Motions to Suppress filed by all 
three (3) defendants. The Court held oral arguments and received testimony and has 
reviewed memoranda submitted by counsel. The facts may be briefly summarized as 
follows: 
On September 22, 1995, at approximately 1:30 p.m. Officer Scott Singleton was 
southbound on 1-15 north of the Perry Port of Entry. He observed a vehicle traveling at an 
above average speed and paced the vehicle in his patrol car at a speed of 72 MPH in a 65 
MPH zone. The vehicle made a sudden lane change from the left lane to the right lane 
without signaling. Trooper Singleton then pulled the vehicle over. During the discussion 
which followed, it was detennined Elmer Mondragon was the owner/driver of the vehicle 
and that he had a valid driver's license. Additionally, it was determined that Casey J. Cutler 
was one of the passengers and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The officer 
had the defendants assist him in testing the turn signals and brake lights and detennined that 
neither the turn signals nor the brake lights were working on the rear of the vehicle, although 
apparently the turn signals did work on the fkmt of the vehicle. Because the front lights 
worked, the officer theorized that a fuse was not out but that perhaps there was a problem 
2 
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with wiring or a light bulb. The defendant opened the trunk of the vehicle and it was 
determined that the tail lights were enclosed in such a way that tools would be required in 
order to gain access to the bulbs. At that time, a single duffle bag was observed in the trunk 
of the car and the officer asked Mondragon if he could look in the duffle bag. Mondragon 
said he could. The officer found a substantial quantity of marijuana in the bag. 
There was clearly probable cause for the initial stop. Additionally, the officer 
appears justified in his conclusion that the vehicle should not proceed down the highway 
without turn signals or brake lights. 
There are several aspects of this scenario which are troubling. The officer indicated 
that he smelled what he interpreted to be tobacco smoke in the car and that he thought that 
the occupants were under age. The driver's license of Casey Joe Cutler plainly showed him 
to be several years older than necessary to possess and smoke tobacco. Additionally, no 
tobacco was located in the vehicle until much later during an inventory search. There 
seemed to be some question whether the officer asked defendant Mondragon to open the 
trunk or whether he directed him to open the trunk.1 In any event, Mondragon opened the 
trunk. Prior to opening the duffle bag, the officer did not have any articulable evidence that 
the bag was involved in any type of criminal activity. 
After carefully considering the authorities cited by counsel and reviewing notes of the 
hearing, the Coun is of the opinion that defendant Mondragon lawfully consented to a search 
of the duffle bag. It is true that the defendant was not free to leave at the time the officer 
requested permission to search the bag. However, the cases indicate there is no bright line 
nor is there any single factor which is dispositive in determining whether a consent is 
voluntary. In this case, the Court finds that the driver gave permission to look in the bag the 
first time such permission was requested. The request came after a reasonably brief 
Defense counsel argue that the officer's entry into the trunk constituted nothing more than a fishing 
expedition. However, the officer testified that on numerous occasions he has assisted motorists with minor 
repairs, including changing fan belts. Because the front blinkers were functioning, the officer reasonably 
concluded that he may be able to resolve the mechanical problem for the defendant. Had the occupants of this 
vehicle been an elderly couple or a mother with young children, the officer would have been expected to 
provide the courtesy of attempting to repair a minor wiring or bulb problem. The fact that he attempted to 
assist these defendants is not viewed as a sinister act. 
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Dated August [{£, 1996. 
Deputy Clerk 
detention. There is likewise an absence of any threats or promises concerning the bag. 
There is no evidence the officer engaged in any trickery nor is there any evidence that the 
defendant's mental state was impaired. The defendant's voluntary consent to search the bag 
was consistent with the defendant's prior behavior; i.e. he had been cooperative with the 
officer. For the foregoing reasons, the consent is adjudged voluntary and the Motions to 
Suppress are denied. 
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